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NOTES 
The Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments 
Recognition Act* 
Many nations do not accord conclusive effect to foreign1 judg-
ments unless their own judicial decrees are reciprocally enforced by 
the country rendering the judgment.2 The law in the United States 
is unsettled, with some states holding that foreign judgments are 
reviewable on the merits if the judgment forum similarly reviews 
the merits of American decrees,3 while others accord conclusive 
effect to valid foreign money judgments regardless of the effect 
accorded American decrees in the judgment forum.4 Judgments in 
the latter states would seem entitled to conclusive enforcement 
in countries requiring reciprocity. However, such conclusive recog-
nition has been hindered because many civil-law courts tend to 
look solely to the legislation of other countries in determining the 
treatment accorded there to foreign judgments,6 and few states in 
the United States have enacted recognition legislation.0 Some civil-
• 9B UNIFORM LAws ANN. 27 (Supp. 1964). 
I. The adjective "foreign" is used throughout this discussion solely with reference 
to foreign nations. 
2. For a list of countries adhering to this approach, see Nadelmann, French Courts 
Recognize Foreign Money-Judgments-One Down and More To Go, 13 AM. J. COMP, 
L. 72, 78-80 (1964); Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments 
Abroad and What To Do About It, 42 IoWA L. R.Ev. 236, 249•57 (1957). 
3. Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 33 So. 2d 870 (1947); Warren v. Warren, 73 Fla, 
764, 75 So. 35 (1917); Northern Aluminum Co. v. Law, 157 Md. 641, 646, 147 Atl. 
715, 717 (1929); Traders Trust Co. v. ,Davidson, 146 Minn. 224, 227, 178 N.W. 735, 
736 (1920); In re Vanderborght, 91 N.E.2d 47, 50 (Ohio C.P. 1950) (dictum); Union 
Sec. Co. v. Adams, 33 Wyo. 45, 236 Pac. 513 (1925) (dictum); cf. N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. ch. 524, § 11 (Supp. 1963) (Canadian judgments granted the same effect as New 
Hampshire judgments are given in Canada). Sec Smith, The Enforcement of Foreign 
Judgments in American Courts, 19 MILlTARY L. R.Ev. I, 8-10 (1963). See also Tremblay 
v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 97 Me. 547, 55 Atl. 509 (1903) (court in which enforcement is 
sought may always inquire into merits of the original action). 
4. E.g., 164 E. 72d St. Corp. v. Ismay, 65 Cal. App. 2d 574, 151 P.2d 29 (1944); 
Coulbom v. Joseph, 195 Ga. 723, 733, 25 S.E.2d 576, 581 (1943); Truscon Steel Co. of 
Canada v. Biegler, 306 Ill. App. 180, 28 N.E.2d 623 (1940); Ticonderoga Pulp &: Paper 
Co., 219 App. Div. 120, 219 N.Y.S. 284, af/'d, 246 N.Y. 603, 159 N.E. 669 (1927); 
Christoff Estate, 411 Pa. 419, 192 A.2d 737 (1963); REsTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS 
§ 434, comment b (1934); cf. l3onfils v. Gillespie, 25 Colo. App. 496, 139 Pac. 1054 
(1914) (dictum recognizing a trend to grant conclusive effect); Bata v. Bata, 163 A,2d 
493 (Del. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 964 (1961); Succession of Fitzgerald, 192 La. 
726, 731, 189 So. 116, 117 (1939); Grey v. Independent Order of Forrestcrs, 196 S.W. 
779 (Mo. App. Ct. 1917) (dictum). See Smith, supra note 3, at 11-14. See also MoNT, 
R.Ev. ConE § 93-1001-27 (1964), and ORE. R.Ev. STAT. § 43.190 (1963), which declare that 
foreign judgments are only prima facie,evidence of the existence of a right between 
the litigants. This presumption, however, is rebuttable by only a limited number of 
generally accepted defenses, which do not include the defense that the judgment 
forum denies reciprocal recognition of American judgments. 
5. Cf. Nadelmann, Non-Recognition of American Money Judgments Abroad and 
What To Do About It, 42 IowA L. REv. 236, 252 (1957). 
6. Prior to the promulgation of the Uniform Act, recognition statutes had been 
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law courts are therefore inclined to conclude, often erroneously, that 
a state does not enforce foreign judgments, and thus does not meet 
the reciprocity requirement, if there is no recognition legislation in 
that state.7 
Even those foreign courts that do look to the case law on the 
recognition of foreign judgments sometimes ignore state court 
decisions granting reciprocity, and refer instead to the United States 
Supreme Court's decision in Hilton v. Guyot8 that the failure of 
the courts of a foreign nation to grant conclusive effect to the 
judgments of an American court precludes conclusive enforcement 
in the United States of a money judgment rendered in that nation 
against an American defendant.9 Reliance upon Hilton often leads 
those foreign courts which themselves demand reciprocity to con-
clude that the "law of the United States" denies conclusive effect 
to foreign judgments.Io The error in this conclusion lies in the 
foreign courts' failure to recognize that Hilton has not been con-
sidered binding on state courts because it was decided on appeal 
from a lower federal court and the decision was based on non-
constitutional grounds.I1 In 1962, the National Conference of Com-
missioners on Uniform State Laws sought to remedy this confusion 
and encourage foreign recognition of American judgments by pro-
mulgating the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition 
Act,12 which, with certain exceptions, requires the conclusive en-
forcement of foreign money judgments which are final and enforce-
able where rendered.IS The Uniform Act was enacted by Illinois 
and Maryland in 1963.14 
Among the Uniform Act's exceptions to conclusive enforcement 
is the traditional protective measure of refusal to enforce a judgment 
rendered by a judicial system which does not afford impartial 
enacted only in California (CAL. CoDE CIV. PROC. § 1915), Maryland (MD. CODE .ANN. 
art. 35, § 39 (1957)), Montana (MoNT. R.Ev. CODE § 93-1001·27 (1964)), New Hampshire 
(N.H. REv. STAT • .ANN. ch. 524, § 11 (Supp. 1963)), and Oregon (ORE. R.Ev. STAT. § 43.190 
(1963)). 
7. See SCHLESINGER, COMPARATIVE LAw 177 (2d ed. 1959). 
8. 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
9. The Court held that the foreign judgment was to be treated as prim.a facie 
evidence of the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 227. 
10. Cf. Nadelmann, supra note 5, at 255-56; Smith, supra note 3, at 26-27. 
11. Cf. REsTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAws § 430e, comment e, at 3 (Tent. 
Draft No. 11, 1965); Lenhoff, Reciprocity and the· Law of Foreign Judgments: A. His• 
torical-Critical Analysis, 16 LA. L. REv. 465, 472 (1956). 
12. 9B UNIFORM LAws ANN. 27 (Supp. 19.64) (hereinafter cited as UNIFORM A<:r). 
13. UNIFORM Acr §§ 2, 3. The requirement that the judgment be conclusive and 
enforceable where rendered is well established at common law. See cases cited in 
Peterson, Res Judicata and Foreign Country Judgments, 24 Omo ST. L.J. 291, 309 
n.88, 313 n.110 (1963). 
14. ILL. STAT. ANN. ch. 77, §§ 121-29 (Supp. 1964); MD. CODE .ANN. an. 35, §§ 53A·l 
(Supp. 1965). 
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tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of law.111 Lack 
of jurisdiction over either the person of the defendant10 or the sub-
ject matter of the litigation17 is specified as a situation in which 
due process is conclusively considered denied. To ensure that Amer-
ican courts will be relatively uniform in their application of stan-
dards of personal jurisdiction when examining the proceedings in 
the judgment forum, the Uniform Act prescribes certain instances 
in which the judgment forum shall be deemed validly to have exer-
cised jurisdiction.18 Although the specified standards tend to reflect 
old notions of constitutional limitations on jurisdiction over non-
residents in domestic litigation, 19 the Commissioners have provided 
for the recognition of the modern, continuing expansion of jurisdic-
tional powers by adding a provision that courts may recognize other 
bases of jurisdiction which are constitutionally acceptable in the 
United States.20 
The court in which enforcement of the judgment is sought is 
15. UNIFORM: Acr § 4(a)(l). Cf. Banco Minero v. Ross, 106 Tex. 522, 172 S.W. 711 
(1915) (refusal to enforce a Mexican judgment rendered without a fair hearing). 
It is not required, however, that the foreign procedures duplicate those utilized in 
the United States. 9B UNIFORM LAws ANN. 30 (Supp. 1964) (Commissioners' Note): 
cf. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. II3 (1895). 
16. UNIFORM Acr § 4(a)(2). Cf. Boivin v. Talcott, 102 F. Supp. 979 (N.D. Ohio 
1951); Bethune v. Bethune, 192 Ark. 8II, 94 S.W.2d 1043 (1936); Rhodesian Gen. Fin. 
&: Trading Trust, Ltd. v. MacQuisten, 170 Misc. 996, II N.Y.S.2d 476 (Sup. Ct. 1939): 
cases cited in Smit, International Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in the United 
States, 9 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 44, 50 n.46 (1962). 
17. UNIFORM Acr § 4(a)(3). Cf. In the Matter of the Estate of Gillies, 8 N.J. 88, 83 
A.2d 889 (1951); Romanchick v. Howard Sav. Institution, Il8 N.J.L. 606, 194 Atl, 185 
(E. &: A. 1937); Matter of Will of Lockwood, 147 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Surr. Ct. 1955): San 
Lorenzo Title &: Improvement Co, v. City Mortgage Co., 124 Tex, 25, 73 S.W .2d 513 
(1934). 
18. UNIFORM Acr § 5(a) provides: 
The foreign judgment shall not be refused recognition for lack of personal 
jurisdiction if: 
(1) the defendant was served personally in the foreign state: 
(2) the defendant voluntarily appeared in the proceedings, other than for the 
purpose of protecting property seized or threatened with seizure in the proceed-
ings or of contesting the jurisdiction of the court over him; 
(3) the defendant prior to the commencement of the proceedings had agreed 
to submit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court with respect to the subject 
matter involved; 
(4) the defendant was domiciled in the foreign state when the proceedings 
were instituted, or, being a body corporate had its principal place of business, 
was incorporated, or had othenvise acquired corporate status, in the foreign state; 
(5) the defendant had a business office in the foreign state and the proceedings 
in the foreign court involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising out 
of business done by the defendant through that office in the foreign state: or 
(6) the defendant operated a motor vehicle or airplane in the foreign state 
and the proceedings involved a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising out of 
such operation. 
19. The currently expanded bases of jurisdiction are discussed in Currie, The 
Growth of the Long Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. 
ILL. L.F. 533; Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due Process Clause and the In Per-
sonam Jurisdiction of State Courts, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569 (1958); Reese &: Galston, 
Doing an Act or Causing Consequences as Bases of Judicial Jurisdiction, 44 IoWA L. 
REv. 249 (1959); Comment, 63 MICH. L. REv. 1028 (1965). 
20. UNIFORM Acr § 5(b). 
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given discretion by the Uniform Act to refuse to enforce the judg-
ment if the defendant did not receive notice of the foreign proceed-
ings in time to defend,21 or if the judgment was obtained by fraud.22 
The act is somewhat ambiguous, however, as to what situations are 
encompassed by these provisions. If no notice whatever was given, or 
if the notice given was inadequate to meet due process objections, it 
would seem that the act's provisions for compulsory refusal to enforce 
a judgment rendered without jurisdiction23 would take precedence 
over the discretionary provision, because failure to give adequate 
notice is a jurisdictional defect.24 Since discretion to refuse enforce-
ment of a judgment when the defendant did not actually receive 
notice in time to defend implies that the court also has the authority 
to enforce the judgment, the best interpretation of this discretionary 
power seems to be that the Commissioners intended it to operate only 
in instances where the plaintiff had given notice sufficient to satisfy 
due process requirements, but notice was not actually received by the 
defendant in time to defend. With regard to the defense of fraud, it 
is presumed that the Commissioners intended to codify the accepted 
common-law view that a foreign judgment should be refused enforce-
ment only on the grounds of extrinsic, rather than intrinsic, fraud.25 
If this assumption is accurate, the implied discretion to enforce a 
judgment obtained through extrinsic fraud on the foreign court 
seems inconsistent with the traditional view that extrinsic fraud com-
pletely vitiates the judgment by preventing the unsuccessful party 
from presenting his case.26 The Maryland legislature has reflected this 
theory by altering its version of the Uniform Act to provide for 
compulsory refusal to enforce a judgment obtained by fraud.27 
21. UNIFORM Ac:r § 4(b)(l). Cf. Parker v. Parker, 155 Fla. 635, 21 So. 2d 141, cert. 
denied, 326 U.S. 718 (1945); In the Matter of the Estate of Paramythiotis, 15 Misc. 2d , 
133, 181 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Surr. Ct. 1958); In re Deckert's Will, 141 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Surr. 
Ct. 1955). 
22. UNIFORM Ac:r § 4(b)(2). Cf. The W. Talbot Dodge, 15 F.2d 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1926); 
Perdikouris v. The Olympos, 185 F. Supp. 140 (E.D. Va. 1960); Title Ins. & Trust 
Co. v. California Dev. Co., 171 Cal. 173, 152 Pac. 542 (1915); In the Matter of the 
Estate of Gillies, 8 N.J. 88, 83 A.2d 889 (1951); cases cited in Peterson, supra note 
13, at 317-18; REsrATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws § 440 (1934). 
23. UNIFORM Ac:r § 4(a)(2). 
24. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &: Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Milli-
ken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928). See also 
In re Deckert's Will, 141 N.Y.S.2d 855 (Surr. Ct. 1955). It has been indicated that 
due process requires state courts not to enforce a foreign judgment rendered without 
jurisdiction. See Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 229 (1946) (dictum); Cherun v. Frish-
man, 236 F. Supp. 292, 296, 298 (D.D.C. 1964); cf. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 
(1917). 
25. See cases cited supra note 22; Reese, The $tatus in This Country of Judgments 
Rendered Abroad, 50 CoLuM. L. REY. 783, 794 (1950). Extrinsic fraud is a fraud on 
the judgment court which deprives the aggrieved party of an adequate opportunity 
to present his case, whereas intrinsic fraud involves matters actually passed upon by 
the court rendering the judgment. Ibid. 
26. See cases cited supra note 22. 
27. Mn. CODE ANN. art. 35, § 53D(a)(4) (Supp. 1965). It is not clear, however, 
whether this provision is limited to extrinsic fraud. 
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The Uniform Act extends further discretionary authority to stay 
the enforcement proceedings if the defendant intends to appeal in 
the judgment forum.28 Discretion is also given to refuse recognition 
of the judgment if the decree is repugnant to the policy of the state 
in which enforcement is sought,29 the proceedings in the foreign 
state were contrary to an agreement between the parties,80 the 
judgment conflicts with a prior judicial decree binding upon the par-
ties, 31 or jurisdiction was .based solely on personal service and the 
court feels that the action should have been dismissed on the 
ground of forum non conveniens.32 It was necessary to leave the rec-
ognition of these defenses in the discretion of the state courts be-
cause of the need to accommodate the discord existing among the 
states as to the propriety of the defenses. While a majority of state 
courts will refuse to enforce a foreign judgment which is repugnant 
to state policy,33 at least one court has refused to entertain this 
defense, on the theory that the original cause of action merges with 
the judgment so that the action to collect the judgment is entirely 
distinct from the original action.84 Discretion in relation to the 
power to refuse enforcement of a judgment when the foreign pro-
ceedings were contrary to an agreement between the parties is 
similarly appropriate because of the multitude of possible types of 
agreements and the attending variances in courts' reactions to them. 
For example, in domestic litigation agreements by the parties purport-
ing to deprive themselves of recourse to the courts have traditionally 
been held void as contrary to public policy.35 In more recent years, 
however, courts in which the original suits are brought have tended 
to decline jurisdiction in deference to reasonable agreements to 
28. UNIFORM ACT § 6. 
29. UNIFORM ACT § 4(b)(3). 
30. UNIFORM ACT § 4(b)(5). 
31. UNIFORM ACT § 4(b)(4). 
32. UNIFORM ACT § 4{b)(6). 
33. See, e.g., Christopher v. Christopher, 198 Ga. 361, 31 S.E.2d 818 (1944); In the 
Matter of the Estate of Gillies, 8 N.J. 88, 83 A.2d 889 (1951); In the Matter of the 
Will of Topcuoglu, 11 Misc. 2d 859, 174 N.Y.S.2d 260 (Surr. Ct. 1958); Smith v. Smith, 
72 Ohio App. 203, 50 N.E.2d 889 (1943); Smit, supra note 16, at 52. Compare Zanzonico 
v. Neeld, 17 N.J. 490, 111 A.2d 772 (1955) (Italian adoption decree enforced where 
child resided with her adoptive parents in the United States after adoption despite 
the nonfulfillment of a statutory requirement that the child reside with the adoptive 
parents for one year preceding the adoption). 
34. Neporany v. Kir, 5 App. Div. 2d 438, 173 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1958) (Canadian money 
judgment for seduction and criminal conversation enforced although the cause of 
action was expressly proscribed in New York by statute). But cf. cases cited in Peterson, 
supra note 13, at 316 n.120; Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo• 
American Law, 33 MICH, L. REv. 1129, 1139-40 (1935), stating that the doctrine of 
merger is inapplicable to foreign judgments. 
35. See, e.g., Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The S.S. Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 
1958), cert. dismissed, 359 U.S. 180, rehearing denied, 359 U.S. 999 (1959); Sebree v. 
Rosen, 374 S.W.2d 132, 140 (Mo. 1964); Arsenis v. Atlantic Tankers, Ltd., 39 Misc. 2d 
124, 240 N.Y.S.2d 69 (N.Y. City Ct. 1963); Beneficial Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Penn• 
sylvania Plan, Inc., 27 Pa. D. &: C.2d 554 (Philadelphia County 1962). 
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oust those courts of jurisdiction.86 It should be noted, however, that 
it is generally accepted that a court's refusal to decline jurisdiction 
does not render that court's judgment assailable.37 The Uniform 
Act's proviso allowing a court to refuse to enforce a judgment 
rendered in a foreign court which refused to defer to an agreement 
by the parties purporting to oust that court of jurisdiction seems 
to be supported by no great amount of authority. Again, because 
of the varying circumstances under which the problem arises, the 
courts of even a single state have accorded divergent treatment to 
judgments conflicting with prior judicial decrees.38 The necessity 
of leaving recognition of a defense in the courts' discretion was 
most compelling, however, with regard to the novel authority to 
refuse enforcement of a judgment rendered in an inconvenient 
forum. No cases have been discovered in which this power was 
exercised at common law. Indeed, some courts feel that the plaintiff 
should not be deprived of a forum where a court has the power to 
exercise jurisdiction, and therefore do not recognize the power to 
dismiss even the original proceedings on the ground of forum non 
conveniens.89 It thus appears that the Commissioners intended this 
power to alter the existing law. While the power given by the act 
allows a state to protect its citizens from seriously inconvenient 
litigation, its wisdom may be challenged on the ground that forum 
non conveniens is a theory whereby the court in which the suit is 
originally brought may, in its discretion, dismiss a suit over which 
it could properly exercise jurisdiction.40 It would seem that another 
court should not be permitted to intrude upon this discretion,41 
36. See, e.g., Wm. H. Muller &: Co. v. Swedish Am. Line, Ltd., 224 F.2d 806 (~d 
Cir. 1955) (deference to an agreement in the litigants' contract that all disputes arising 
out of the contract would be tried in Swedish courts); Pakhuismeesteren, S.A. v. The 
S.S. Goettingen, 225 F. Supp. 888 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (deference to agreement to try dis-
putes in a German court); E. H. Marhoefer, Jr., Co. v. Mount Sinai, Inc., 190 F. Supp. 
355 (D. Wis. 1961) (arbitration agreement). See also Berry v. Struble, 20 Cal. App. 2d 
299, 66 P .2d 746 (1937) (agreement not to sue). 
37. Cf. Wm. H. Muller &: Co. v. Swedish Am. Line Ltd., supra note 36, at 808: 
"[T]he parties by agreement cannot oust a court of jurisdiction otherwise obtain-
ing .••. " 
38. Compare Perkins v. De Witt, 197 Misc. 369, 94 N.Y.S.2d 177 (1950), order afj'd 
in part, reversed in part, 279 App. Div. 903, 111 N.Y.S.2d 752 (1952) (reversal of an 
order refusing to enforce a Philippine money judgment which conflicted with a prior 
New York judgment), with Ambatielos v. Foundation Co., 203 Misc. 470, 116 N.Y.S.2d 
641 (1952) (enforcement of a British judgment on an oral employment contract which 
had been held -unenforceable by a Greek court in a second proceeding as a contra-
vention of Greek public policy). 
39. Alabama, Missouri, Nebraska, Ohio, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin are 
listed in Comment, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 740, 741 n.8, 753 n.45 (1962), as having rejected 
the doctrine of forum non conveniens. 
40. Cf. People ex rel. Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry. v. Clark, 12 Ill. 2d 515, 147 N.E.2d 
89 (1957); Blaustein v. Pan American Petroleum &: Transp. Co., 174 Misc. 601, 658, 
21 N.Y.S.2d 651, 706 (1940). . 
41. See People ex rel. Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry. v. Clark, supra note 40 (refusal to 
dismiss action on grounds of forum non conveniens cannot be corrected by man-
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especially if the foreign tribunal does not even recognize the de-
fense.42 
An interesting problem is presented as to whether state involve-
ment in the enforcement of foreign judgments is unconstitutional 
as an infringement on the exclusive federal power over foreign af-
fairs. In Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,43 the Supreme Court 
declared that a federal common law controls any litigation concern-
ing the public acts of foreign sovereigns. The Court supported the 
view expressed in an article by Professor Jessup44 that Erie R.R. v. 
Tompkins45 was not intended to preclude the existence of a federal 
common law governing legal problems affecting international rela-
tions. However, Sabbatino dealt with a problem having strong dip• 
lomatic overtones,46 and the treatment to be accorded foreign 
money judgments would seem to create no significant diplomatic 
complications.47 A more analogous situation was presented in loan• 
nou v. New York,48 in which state legislation regulating the inheri-
tance of property by aliens was alleged to intrude upon the exclusive 
federal power in foreign affairs. The appeal to the Supreme Court 
from a decision adverse to this contention was dismissed for lack of 
a substantial federal question; Justices Black and Douglas, however, 
felt that if the purpose of the legislation was to preclude unfriendly 
governments from obtaining funds, it would be an unlawful attempt 
to regulate foreign affairs.49 Since both the inheritance of property 
in Ioannou and the recognition of money judgments involve only 
private rights and apparently have only an indirect effect on the 
affairs of foreign nations, it would seem that the Uniform Act is 
within the constitutionally permissible powers of the states.60 
damus); R.EsTATEMENT (SECOND), CoNFUCT OF LAws § 117e, comment g (Tent. Draft 
No. 4, 1957) (full faith and credit requirements preclude refusal to recognize a sister 
state judgment rendered in an inconvenient forum). 
42. Apparently, no European country recognizes any defense similar to forum non 
conveniens. See VON MERREN & TRAUTMAN, MUL11STATE PROBLEMS 765 n.271 (1965). 
43. 376 U.S. 398 (1964). For analyses of Sabbatino, see Henkin, The Foreign Affairs 
Power of the Federal Courts-Sabbatino, 64 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 805 (1964); Comment, 63 
MICH. L. REV. 528 (1965). 
44 • .Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964), referring to 
Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to International Law, 
33 .AM. J. INT'L L. 740 (1939). 
45. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
46. The question in Sabbatino concerned the effect to be accorded a decree by the 
government of Cuba expropriating the sugar of a corporation of which ninety per 
cent of the stockholders were United States citizens. 
47. The recognition of foreign money judgments has been described as a question 
of private rights rather than public relations. Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Trans• 
atlantique, 242 N.Y. 381, 386-87, 152 N.E. 121, 123 (1926). 
48. 371 U.S. 30, dismissing an appeal for want of a substantial federal question 
from In the Matter of the Estate of Marek, 11 N.Y.2d 740, 181 N.E.2d 456 (1962). 
49. 371 U.S. at 34. 
50. See also Lenhoff, Reciprocity-The Legal Aspect of a Perennial Idea, 49 Nw. 
U.L. REv. 619, 762 (1954), suggesting that "there is no more reason for forcing the 
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The question remains whether in diversity cases the Erie doctrine 
compels federal courts to adhere to state law where the state omits 
the reciprocity requirement. There are nQ federal cases disposing of 
the issue.51 While one commentator has suggested an argument in 
favor of retaining the requirement of reciprocity in federal courts 
if it is a rule of evidence,52 it would seem erroneous to characterize 
the rule of reciprocity as evidentiary. The doctrine of reciprocity 
does not deal with the form of proof required to establish a right 
to conclusive recognition. A judgment is admissible evidence in all 
actions to collect on the judgment, regardless of whether a given 
court adheres to the doctrine of reciprocity. The question is the 
effect to be accorded the evidence, and there appears to be general 
agreement, at least as regards domestic judgments, that with the ex-
ception of the federal question of '~full faith and credit," which has 
no application to foreign judgments,53 state law controls the effect 
to be accorded a prior judgment between the parties.54 
The traditional "outcome test" for determining whether a federal 
court must apply state law in a diversity case dictates that state law 
must be applied if the application of a federal rule could reasonably 
be expected to alter the result of the litigation.55 The doctrine of 
reciprocity specifies that the merits of a case must be re-tried when 
the country issuing the judgment does not conclusively enforce 
American decrees; since the outcome of a new trial could differ sig-
nificantly from the result achieved in the foreign proceedings, jt 
seems clear that the outcome test requires federal courts to follow 
state law as to reciprocity. This test has been somewhat weakened, 
however, where federal involvement is significant.56 An example of 
states to follow the United States Supreme Court in the question of recognition of 
judgments of foreign countries than there would be for making them follow federal 
law in other matters of conflict-of-law, such as choice of law problems. There is no 
question that the latter [falls) within the power of the states ••.• " 
51. In Gull v. Constam, 105 F. Supp. 107 (D. Colo. 1952), the court circumvented 
the issue of lack of reciprocity because of the defendant's failure to plead it as a 
defense. 
52. Smith, supra note 3, at 15-16. Smith cited no authority for this proposition, 
but he probably based it upon such cases as Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications, 
Inc., 294 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1961), in which it was held that hearsay evidence was 
admissible in a diversity action brought in a federal court although the evidence 
would not have been admissible in a state court and its admission by the federal 
court affected the outcome of the case. 
53. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S. 185 (1912). 
54. Cf. Ayers v. Kidney, 333 F.2d 812, 814 (6th Cir. 1964) (action to collect on a 
judgment); Pallen v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 223 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) (col-
lateral estoppel); Makariw v. Rinard, 222 F. Supp. 336, 338 (E.D. Pa. 1963) (res judi-
cata). See also Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941), holding that 
federal courts must apply state conflict-of-laws rules in diversity cases. 
55. See Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). 
56. See, e.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958) (federal 
rules apply where related to function of federal jury as established by the consti-
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this trend of allowing federal law to prevail is Hanna v. Plumer,tsr in 
which the Supreme Court held that a difference in outcome did not 
preclude the application of the federal rules for service of process set 
forth in Rule 4(d)(l) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. How-
ever, the Court expressed in dictum that the policy of Erie was to dis-
courage forum-shopping58 and that a state rule is to be followed when 
"application of the rule would have so important an effect upon the 
fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure to enforce it would 
be likely to cause a plaintiff to choose the federal court."60 This state-
ment clearly indicates that federal courts should adhere to the omis-
sion of the reciprocity requirement in a state where the Uniform Act 
is in force. Othenvise, foreign judgment creditors would avoid seek-
ing enforcement of their judgment rights in federal courts if it were 
possible to seek enforcement by a state court under the Uniform Act. 
Except for its omission of the defense of lack of reciprocity, the 
Uniform Act does not compel the enforcement of foreign money 
judgments in situations other than those in which courts have been 
accustomed to enforcement under the common-law principle of 
comity. Indeed, the act's discretionary defenses could provide a 
lower court with greater possibilities for avoiding enforcement, al-
though the practical impact of these defenses may prove insignificant 
if the courts exercise their newly acquired discretion in a manner 
consistent with prior decisions. The major contributions of the Uni-
form Act, therefore, rest in compelling enforcement of qualifying 
foreign money judgments rather-than basing their enforcement on 
the elastic principle of comity, and in omitting the defense of reci-
procity. 
It remains to be seen whether the act will accomplish its goal of 
aiding American judgment creditors in obtaining enforcement of 
their American judgment rights in countries requiring reciprocity: 
The codification has the advantage of assuring civil-law courts that 
in certain instances their judgments will be enforced in state courts. 
The Uniform Act is also a more comprehensive statement of the law 
of recognition than has been achieved in most states by judicial fiat. 
However, the many defenses to conclusive enforcement may lead 
some foreign courts to declare that the Uniform Act does not provide 
sufficient assurance that a state will conclusively enforce foreign 
judgments.60 Nevertheless, the general purpose of the act in seeking 
tution); Hope v. Hearst Consol. Publications, Inc., 294 F.2d 681 (2d Cir. 1961) (hearsay 
evidence); 15 VAND. L. REv. 1330 (1962). 
57. 380 U.S. 460 (1965). 
58. Id. at 467-68. 
59. Id. at 468 n.9. 
60. See, e.g., Rh. & M., Reichsgericht (VII. Zivilsenat), March 26, 1909, 70 ENTSCHEI• 
DUNGEN DES REICHSGERICHTS IN ZMLSACHEN 434, where the German Supreme Court 
refused COJ!-clusive enforcement of decrees of state and federal courts in California 
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to influence enforcement of American judgments abroad is the same
as that attributed to the Supreme Court in Hilton.61 The Court
attempted to achieve this goal by refusing to recognize a foreign
money judgment until the foreign court consented to recognize
American judgments. In seventy years, this highly criticized ap-
proach has achieved little but stalemate.62 The drafters of the Uni-
form Act have recognized not only the futility of waiting for foreign
nations to take the initiative by recognizing American money judg-
ments regardless of the effect given judgments of the foreign courts
in the United States, but also the injustice which this stalemate has
caused American judgment creditors.
on the grounds that California law did not meet reciprocity requirements. The Ger-
man court felt that the California provisions for evaluating the jurisdiction of German
courts allowed re-examination of German judgments on the merits, that the defense
of fraud under California law went farther than was permitted under German law,
and that California afforded equitable remedies against final judgments which were
unavailable under German law. A discussion of this case is found in Nadelmann,
supra note 5, at 252-53.
61. See Peterson, supra note 13, at 305-06.
62. See, e.g., 2 BEAU, CONfLIrC OF LAwS § 434.3 (1935); Goonucn, CONFUCT OF
LAws § 208, at 605-08 (3d ed. 1949); Nadelmann, supra note 5, at 249-54; Peterson,
supra note 13, at 305-06; Reese, supra note 25, at 793; Smith, supra note 3, at 26-27;
Comment, 37 NorEx DAmE LAw. 88, 96 (1962). A uniform act was suggested in Nadel-
mann, Reprisals Against American Judgments?, 65 HARv. L. R-v. 1184, 1191 (1952),
as a possible means of obtaining conclusive recognition of American judgments
abroad.
Notes
